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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
STODDARD V. STATE 
By: Kayleigh Toth 
TRIAL COURT'S REQUIREMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
TESTIFY BEFORE THE FINAL DEFENSE WITNESS WAS A 
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE 
PROCESS AND RIGHT AGAINST COMPELLED SELF 
INCRIMINATION; IT WAS NOT ERROR TO ADMIT 
EVIDENCE OF A DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS TO 
REHABILITATE A WITNESS OR PERMIT A QUESTION 
IMPLYING THE DEFENDANT POSED A THREAT TO A 
CHILD TO SHOW A WITNESS'S MOTIVE TO FALSIFY 
TESTIMONY. 
All Recent Developments are available on the University of Baltimore 
Law Forum website: http://law.ubalt.eduJlawforum. 






STODDARD V. STATE: TRIAL COURT’S REQUIREMENT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT TESTIFY BEFORE THE FINAL 
DEFENSE WITNESS WAS A VIOLATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT 
AGAINST COMPELLED SELF INCRIMINATION; IT WAS 
NOT ERROR TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF A DEFENDANT’S 
PRIOR BAD ACTS TO REHABILITATE A WITNESS OR 
PERMIT A QUESTION IMPLYING THE DEFENDANT POSED 
A THREAT TO A CHILD TO SHOW A WITNESS’S MOTIVE 
TO FALSIFY TESTIMONY. 
 
By: Kayleigh Toth 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a criminal defendant 
has a constitutional right to decide when to testify, and may use that 
right as a tactical advantage.  Stoddard v. State, 423 Md. 420, 31 A.3d 
603 (2011).  Due to the unique procedural circumstances, the trial 
court’s error in ordering the defendant to testify at a particular time 
was harmless.  Id. at 441, 31 A.3d at 615.  Additionally, the court held 
that the admission of evidence concerning the defendant’s prior 
assaults and the State’s questions regarding a witness’s motive to 
testify falsely were not unfairly prejudicial.  Id. at 443-46, 31 A.3d at 
616-18.   
     On June 15, 2002, Nick Dieter (“Dieter”) found his ex-wife’s 
daughter, Calen DiRubbo (“Calen”), dead in her home.  The police 
arrested Dieter under the assumption that Calen’s fatal injuries 
occurred immediately prior to her death while in Dieter’s care.  
Subsequently, the medical examiner determined the cause of death 
was blunt force injuries resulting in internal bleeding and estimated 
that the fatal injuries were inflicted during a period when Calen was 
with Erik Stoddard (“Stoddard”).  Shortly after Calen’s death, Cheryl 
DiRubbo (“DiRubbo”), Calen’s mother and Stoddard’s girlfriend, 
gave a recorded statement to the police stating that Stoddard abused 
her and Calen, which she later recanted at trial.     
     A jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Stoddard 
of second-degree murder and child abuse resulting in death, but the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded for a new trial.  
After a second jury convicted Stoddard, the trial court granted 
Stoddard’s Motion for a New Trial due to its failure to ask a 
mandatory voir dire question.  During Stoddard’s third trial, 
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scheduling issues arose when the trial did not finish before the judge’s 
out of state judicial conference.  Defense counsel requested to call the 
remaining witnesses after the trial resumed because an expert was 
unavailable and the defense wanted to avoid a split in Stoddard’s 
testimony.  The judge then instructed defense counsel to call Stoddard 
if he wished to testify.  Stoddard elected not to testify at that time and 
reserved his right to do so before the close of the defense’s case.  
However, the judge did not permit this reservation and explained that 
by declining to testify at that moment Stoddard would forfeit his right 
to testify altogether.  After he adamantly objected, Stoddard took the 
stand.   
     Stoddard also objected to statements concerning his prior bad acts 
and the State’s question to DiRubbo, “[a]nd you wouldn’t want 
anything to happen to [your son], would you,” after playing the 
recorded statement.  At the trial’s conclusion, the jury found Stoddard 
guilty of child abuse and manslaughter.  Stoddard appealed and the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed.  The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted Stoddard’s petition for a writ of certiorari to 
determine two issues.  First, whether the trial court erred in forcing 
Stoddard to testify before the last defense witness or lose his right to 
testify.  Second, whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 
prior bad acts and a question implying Stoddard posed a threat to a 
child. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing 
whether the court may compel a defendant to testify at a particular 
time.  Stoddard, 423 Md. at 433, 31 A.3d at 611.  The court adopted 
the analysis in Brooks v. Tennessee to determine if a violation 
occurred and if the violation constituted harmless error.  Id. at 435, 31 
A.3d at 612 (citing United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 812 (10th 
Cir. 1988)).  In Brooks, despite a legitimate state interest to prevent 
testimonial influence, the Supreme Court struck down a statute 
requiring the defense to call a defendant as the first witness.  Stoddard, 
420 Md. at 433-34, 31 A.3d at 611 (citing Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 
U.S. 605 (1972)).  The Supreme Court held the statute violated a 
defendant’s right to due process, effective assistance of counsel, and 
right against compelled self-incrimination.  Stoddard, 420 Md. at 433-
34, 31 A.3d at 611 (citing Brooks, 406 U.S. 605).   
     With the Brooks decision in mind, the court balanced the trial 
court’s ability to exercise discretion in scheduling cases to prevent 
delay against a defendant’s constitutional rights.  Stoddard, 423 Md. at 
436, 31 A.3d at 612.  Specifically, the court highlighted that 
precluding a defendant from testifying after he refused the trial judge’s 
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request to take the stand is not a “constitutionally permissible” method 
of preserving judicial economy and preventing delay.  Id. at 436, 31 
A.3d at 613 (citing Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611).  The court found a 
defendant’s decision when to testify is a constitutional right that the 
defendant may use strategically, even if, as the State contends, it is for 
a tactical advantage.  Stoddard, 423 Md. at 437, 31 A.3d at 613 (citing 
Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612). 
     Despite finding a Brooks violation occurred, the court performed an 
independent review of the record and concluded the error was 
harmless and did not influence the verdict.  Stoddard, 423 Md. at 438, 
31 A.3d at 614 (citing Morse v. State, 418 Md. 194, 221-22, 13 A.3d 
1206, 1222 (2011)).  The court found that because the defense’s theory 
of the case relied on Stoddard’s testimony, Stoddard would have 
testified regardless of the judge’s demand.  Stoddard, 413 Md. at 439-
40, 31 A.3d at 614-15.  Additionally, the court noted that whether a 
defendant previously indicated an intention to testify is a key 
consideration in evaluating a Brooks violation.  Id. at 439, 31 A.3d at 
614 (citing State v. Turner, 751 A.2d 372, 384 (Conn. 2000)).  In light 
of the procedural history, including the fact that Stoddard retained the 
same counsel and expert witness in his third trial as in the prior two 
trials, the court inferred Stoddard had knowledge of the expert 
witness’s testimony.  Stoddard, 413 Md. at 440, 31 A.3d at 615.  
Although the trial court erred in demanding Stoddard to testify before 
the defense’s last witness, the court held the error was harmless 
because it did not affect Stoddard’s testimony or influence the jury’s 
verdict.  Id. at 440-41, 31 A.3d at 615.  
     The court then addressed the admissibility of Stoddard’s prior bad 
acts and the State’s question implying that Stoddard posed a danger to 
DiRubbo’s son.  Stoddard, 423 Md. at 442-45, 31 A.3d at 616-18.  
The court found the trial court properly admitted Dieter’s statement 
that Stoddard assaulted him on several occasions.  Id. at 442-43, 31 
A.3d at 616-17.  Maryland Rule 5-616(c) permitted the statement to 
rehabilitate Dieter’s credibility after the defense’s cross-examination 
revealed Dieter omitted information to the police.  Id. at 442, 31 A.3d 
at 616.  The court determined the trial court correctly found Dieter’s 
statements were not unfairly prejudicial and simply provided an 
explanation as to why he originally omitted facts to the police.  Id. at 
443, 31 A.3d at 617.   
     Finally, since DiRubbo recanted her previous statements to the 
police during direct-examination, the trial court properly allowed the 
State’s line of questioning and admission of DiRubbo’s recorded 
statement.  Stoddard, 423 Md. at 443-44, 31 A.3d at 617-18.  The 
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court held that the circuit court did not err in admitting the evidence 
under Maryland Rule 5-616(b) for the limited purpose of impeaching 
DiRubbo’s recantation and to show her motive for testifying falsely.  
Id. at 444, 31 A.3d at 617.  
     In Stoddard, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that 
defendants have a constitutional right to control the strategic decisions 
relating to their case.  As a result, in Maryland, a criminal defendant 
has a constitutionally protected right to decide, not only whether to 
testify, but when to testify.  Given the court’s recognition of the 
unique procedural posture of this particular case, the finding of 
harmless error should not be over emphasized.  Although courts 
possess broad discretion in scheduling trials and preventing delay, 
Stoddard stresses that a defendant’s constitutional rights outweigh 
considerations of judicial efficiency.  
 
